In several US states, the legalisation ofeuthanasia has become a question for voters to decide in public referenda. This democratic approach in politics is consistent with notions ofpersonal autonomy in medicine, but No longer is the debate over the legalisation of doctorassisted suicide and active euthanasia limited to the pages of ethics journals or the forums of scholarly conferences. The social policy debate over these issues crossed a significant threshold in the United States in November of 1991 when citiziens of Washington State participated in an unprecedented public referendum on whether to amend their 1979 Natural Death Act to permit 'aid-in-dying', a 'medical service provided in person by a physician, that will end the life of a conscious and mentally competent qualified patient in a dignified, painless and humane manner ...' (1) . While the referendum failed by a 53 per cent -47 per cent margin, proponents pointed to the over 700,000 votes cast in favour of the referendum as evidence of mounting public support for legal change, and have begun the process of bringing similar proposals before the voters of California in 1992 and Oregon in 1994.
Should doctor-assisted suicide or performance of active euthanasia on voluntary request be legally permitted? I want to examine the ethical and policy dimensions of this new threshold by drawing upon the moral criteria invoked in those situations in which society already allows for justified exceptions to the traditional rule prohibiting the taking of human life. We will then be positioned to ask whether a new exception to this rule should be carved out for the practices embedded in the concept of 'aid-in-dying'. We need first to attend to some cultural and social factors that help explain why the religious, moral, professional, and policy debate over doctor-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia has emerged with such vigour in recent years.
The social nexus
We need first to recall that the practice and the term 'euthanasia' have a value-laden history. As several medical historians have indicated, for example, the prohibition of euthanasia in the Hippocratic Oath, 'I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect', presumes a background of acceptance and practice of administering 'deadly drugs' in the earliest western cultures of Greece and Rome (2) . Moreover, the etymological root of euthanasia conveys a meaning of an 'easy, painless, happy' death, and it is with this meaning that the term first entered the English language in 1646 (3). It is this classically-informed meaning that contemporary proponents want to retrieve in their use of the language of 'aid-in-dying'. A different terminology is required, however, because 'euthanasia' has acquired strong negative moral connotations over the last century owing to assumptions that such a 'good death' can be brought about only through violating religious, professional, and social prohibitions against killing. Embedded in these two diverse associations -the 'classical' and the 'Nazi' sense of euthanasia -is the cultural conundrum responsible for the emergence of 'aid-in-dying' as a question on Paradoxically, this experience of loss of control by patients has occurred precisely during the era that medicine, ethics, and the law have converged to place tremendous stress on respect for patient autonomy and self-determination. This ideology of patient control of end-of-life decisions has, of course, been the motivation for much of the political and legislative activity in the area of 'advance directives', 'living wills', and 'durable power of attorney for health care' statutes, which culminated in the United States in the passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990. This Act requires, as of December 1, 1991, all healthcare facilities that receive federal funds to provide information about advance directives to patients on admission into the facility (7) . This discrepancy between the ideology of personal control and the experience of loss of control can, in the view of some, be rectified only by recognising, a 'fundamental right' possessed by terminally ill patients to ensure control, the right to assistance in dying, in suicide, or to euthanasia.
To explain some of the cultural catalysts for public debate and referenda on 'aid-in-dying' does not, to be sure, suggest how either the ethical or the legal debate ought to be resolved. It does illuminate, however, several features to which any such discussion needs to be sensitive: a caring, supportive context for dying (such as is provided by hospices); a need of terminally ill patients to be free from protracted pain and suffering; and, an assertion of freedom and control over how, and when, and where one is to die. The question I now wish to engage is whether it is possible to express adequate sensitivity to these considerations, and affirm the dignity of the dying while relieving their pain and suffering, short The Washington ballot referendum was not inattentive to such points; indeed, it was designed with safeguards to ensure that such procedural elements would be present in a patient choice for 'aid-in-dying'. One may nevertheless dispute whether the procedural protections were in fact met by the proposal: unlike the de facto requirements in the Netherlands, for example, it did not stipulate that the patient's request must be persistent and continual, nor did it require that the participating doctor be in an ongoing relationship with the patient, both of which requirements would seem crucial to assessing the moral authenticity of the patient's request for assisted suicide or active euthanasia.
At the same time, moral attention must necessarily focus on the substance of the request and I would question whether patient self-determination is or should be the exclusive moral consideration in assessment of doctor-assisted suicide or active euthanasia. There are first of all issues regarding the scope of the right to self-determination: in the same way that Mill felt the principle of freedom did not permit alienating freedom through voluntary slavery (9), we can ask whether the right to self-determination encompasses the capacity to extinguish the determining self. Moreover, the general right of selfdetermination regarding the choice of the manner and time of one's death is a right of non-interference against others, particularly the state; for that same reason, however, it cannot obligate any particular individual, let alone the entire medical profession, to assist a given patient in carrying out his or her desires. Doctors 
A final concern is that even though self-determination is a necessary condition for such a request to be morally valid, it should not be deemed sufficient. We need instead to distinguish between having a right and right conduct. Rather than assuming that the right of choice implies that all choices are morally equal, this distinction requires us to consider the other criteria of justification for taking human life.
Cause or purpose
In practices of caring for the dying, what moral purposes or ends might give support to the taking of human life? It is possible to differentiate morally permissible and impermissible reasons. For example, the restoration and affirmation of human dignity in dying is a valid and important objective in any programme of care for the terminally ill and certainly extends to efforts to give the person a sense of control over his or her own dying by promoting their decisionmaking capacity. Secondly, caregivers are rightly concerned with the pain and suffering of the terminally ill and how they can best express the virtues ofcare and compassion, that is, to suffer with another.
At the same time, proposals for doctor-assisted suicide or active euthanasia that appeal to efficiency or cost-effectiveness seem callous and morally indefensible. In a recent commentary in the Amenrcan Medical News, doctor John Wrable, after relating that in the preceding six months three terminal cancer patients had asked him to terminate their lives, asserted: 'Active euthanasia is a realistic alternative to the extraordinary measures being used today to keep patients alive, and it's cost effective ... because it reduces the terminally ill patient's hospital stay and stops the use of expensive machines and drugs'. Wrable then calculated that 'strictly controlled' active euthanasia in ICU's would save $16,500/patient, and millions of dollars overall. 'With active euthanasia the cost of medical care of the terminally ill would drop precipitously' (10).
Still others have expressed strong objections to the 'social costs' of prolonging the life of a terminally ill patient relative to money and resources consumed that might be spent instead on education, housing for the homeless, or better general health care. On such accounts, the paramount reason for euthanasia is neither patient dignity nor relief of patient suffering, but saving money; not the patient's interests but those of society. What of measures to alleviate the pain and suffering of patients? It is important to acknowledge that all sides in the debate over legalised euthanasia seem to agree that more effective pain therapy in the terminal stage would substantially lessen patient requests for assistance in dying or euthanasia. Yet, ongoing collaboration with caregivers, including discussions with doctors who perform active euthanasia in the Netherlands, have convinced me that the US at any rate has not fully depleted biomedical research alternatives for pain control. A consequence of the obsession with the technological conquest of death is the failure to make pain relief the primary goal in care of the dying, and a lessened priority to developing such methods in medical research.
In addition, stronger social support needs to be given to alternative settings or approaches, such as hospices, which assign a high priority to the relief of pain and suffering. Yet the hospice movement in the United States actually began to decline in the late 1980s. As well, the US ought to rethink its societal prohibition of heroin as a method of pain relief in light of the experience of Great Britain, which has used heroin for terminally ill cancer patients for several years without uncontrollable problems (11) . Thus, current practices all seem to conspire to tell patients that dying means abandonment and that assisted suicide or euthanasia is the only resort that provides deliverance. My contention, by contrast, is that these various failures indicate there is not yet sufficient evidence that in caring for the dying, the US has reached the point at which doctor-assisted suicide or active euthanasia are the only resorts caregivers have to affirm patient dignity and control and alleviate patient pain and suffering.
Outcomes
If assisted suicide or euthanasia were a legal option for terminally ill patients, what results or consequences might reasonably be expected to ensue? For many opponents, the burden of the case against legalising such practices finally rests on the 'slippery slope' objection, namely, that even if isolated acts of doctorassisted suicide or voluntary active euthanasia might be morally permissible and effectively regulated, the cumulative effect of a practice of legal toleration would produce greatly undesired consequences. My argument so far has acknowledged both that there are reasons for moral suspicion of doctor-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia even before we get to concerns about consequences, and that proposed legislation (Washington) or de facto practice (the Netherlands) can build in vital procedural safeguards to meet many of the fears of opponents that a practice of voluntary euthanasia will slide down the slope to non-voluntary or involuntary euthanasia through mistakes in diagnosis and prognosis and abuses.
It may be possible in practice to prevent mistakes and abuses through rigorous adherence to procedural safeguards and monitoring, though of course any law will likely be both imperfectly implemented and will reflect the limits and fallibilities of its human originators. Still, even if we rule out the worst-case scenario that societal toleration of legalised euthanasia will lead us to re-visit Nazi Germany, other prospective outcomes need our consideration. What, for example, will be the impact of such toleration on the moral character (and social esteem) of medicine as a 'healing' profession? For many medical practitioners, though certainly not all, doctor-assisted suicide or active euthanasia violates the moral core and purposes of medicine. Related concerns are the consequences of such a practice for the relationship between patients and health care professionals; it's not simply, as proposed in the worst-case scenarios, that permitting assisted suicide or euthanasia in medicine might erode the trust constitutive of a successful relationship and replace it with patient distrust and suspicion. A more pressing concern is that what passes for a 'successful' relationship might more and more become a matter of discharging legal and contractual obligations, in which the historical fiduciary character of the relationship may give way before a kind of moral minimalism between strangers.
Finally, what impact might an allowance for taking life by medical professionals have on the core cultural ethos of respect for human life? Will the procedural safeguards successfully compartmentalise 'aid-indying', effectively confining it to a 'medical service' for a specialised kind of patient, such that generalisations to other public domains would be inappropriate? Will it have any more impact on respect for life than the exceptions we currently allow? However inconclusive prospective answers to these questions might be, given the strong presumptions against taking human life embedded in morality, law, and human nature, it seems unwise to think such a practice would have no impact whatsoever. As the novelist John Updike has written: 'Death, once it enters in, leaves its muddy footprints everywhere'.
Proportionality
The question of whether a practice of doctor-assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia will produce a favourable balance between the benefits and harms of taking life needs to be addressed not simply to the merits of a particular legislative proposal, but also to whether such a proposal provides a more favourable balance than other alternative approaches. In this respect, proponents of legal change have overlooked how much flexibility already is built into our current legal structure. Such actions in general might currently be treated under homicide statutes, but as illustrated recently by the controversy in the state of Michigan over the participation of doctor Jack Kevorkian in the suicides of three non-terminal patients, there is considerable flexibility and discretion involved at every stage in the legal process, from prosecuting a case, to convicting a person (the 'temporary insanity' defence has been successfully used in some cases to excuse persons from responsibility for their actions), to sentencing, in which the motive of 'mercy' might be grounds for a reduced sentence or even clemency. Although Dr Kevorkian has been charged with violations of the law, he has neither been convicted nor sentenced (though after the latest episode in October 1991, his medical licence was suspended by the Michigan Board of Medicine. However, this decision is currently on appeal).
One might well contend that if the law is being flouted, either overtly or covertly, then there is little value in retaining the law. However, the issue here is of a quite different magnitude than breaking a speed limit on the motorway. Taking human life, in any context, is a morally and existentially serious matter, and we want would-be mercy killers to understand in advance the gravity of their actions. Rather than espousing a fairly substantial change in the laws governing medical practice, society is better served, I maintain, by having a general, blanket prohibition of 'aid-in-dying'. This approach will symbolically affirm the social value of respect for human life and also serve as a form of deterrent. We can at the same time acknowledge the necessity for flexibility and discretion in individual cases that is already embedded in the law.
Limitations
Can the taking of life be limited to death. Whatever the appropriate moral paradigm for 'aid-in-dying', however, it needs to be acknowledged squarely that the contemplated actions do symbolise a departure from the traditional norms governing medicine, ethics, and law and therefore need assessment independently of refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment. Moreover, the questions I have identified are so central to our discourse about the taking of human life that it's rather difficult to imagine a discussion of the issue without having at least implicit recourse to them.
It is important in conclusion, to emphasise the ground common to different perspectives in this debate. There is a great deal of consensus about the rights of competent patients both to choose and to decline medical treatment and about the need to protect incompetent patients. There is common ground on the importance of restoring control over dying to the patient and of alleviating patient pain and suffering, and that society needs to provide the resources such that caregivers can do a better job in both areas. There is general agreement that there are social, legal, and practical alternatives -advance directives, hospices, pain control -to assisted suicide and euthanasia that can obtain these objectives, so that even in ideal circumstances, the taking of life in medical practice must always be morally optional, not obligatory. There is a shared view that questions of social productivity or cost-effectiveness, which might well ground a notion of obligatory suicide or euthanasia, are not morally valid features for this particular debate. If our public discussion of euthanasia is not to be a dialogue of the deaf, we need to build on this common ground.
criteria of the 'just-war' tradition, but my normative point is that similar questions and criteria emerge in any context where we contemplate making an exception or overriding a moral obligation or moral presumption, such as the rule prohibiting the taking of human life. (9) What can be done about our ignorance?
Our first priority must be to understand the extent of our ignorance and share it with the public, patients and policymakers. To some extent this is happening but mostly the urge to confess to limitations is driven by the fear of being sued. Litigation against doctors does seem to be a nemesis for what Ivan Illich called their hubris (1 1). Charting our ignorance should also allow us to set research priorities: we should concentrate on researching what we most need to know. The setting of research priorities cannot, however, be driven entirely by the need to know because many things that we would like to know may at the moment be essentially unknowable -for example, an effective treatment for dementia would be wonderful but is unlikely to be forthcoming when our knowledge of brain function is so primitive. A more honest admission of ignorance might mean an increase in funding for research and technology assessment, and even if new money cannot be found it might make sense to shift resources from the provision of unproved services to research.
Those who fund research and publish its results may need to set higher standards, and everybody involved in health care and research should insist on evidence for statements and should focus on outcomes. There is already an increase in consensus statements and practice guidelines, but these need to be examined critically. Finally, there needs to be more analytical training in medicine: doctors need to be better at assessing the quality of the evidence on which they base their practices.
Richard Smith is editor ofthe British Medical Journal.
